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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists (AFTRA)
Award
and
Herman Spero Productions, Inc.

The Undersigned having been duly designated in accordance
with the Arbitration Agreement between the above named parties
and having been duly sworn and having duly heard the claims and
counter-claims of said parties at the first hearing on October
18, 1971; and having duly heard the counter-claims of AFTRA at
the second hearing on August 14, 1972, Herman Spero Productions,
Inc. having expressly declined to appear at said second hearing,
makes the following AWARD:
1. Herman Spero Productions, Inc. and AFTRA are
signatories to the 1963-66 AFTRA National Code
of Fair Practice for Network Television Broadcasting. Also, Herman Spero Productions, Inc.
is a signatory to a rider to said Code whereby
it is agreed to abide by the terms and conditions of the 1966-69 AFTRA National Code of Fair
Practice for Network Television Broadcasting.
2. Herman Spero Productions, Inc. was the Producer
of a program entitled "Upbeat." As a result of
disputes between AFTRA and Herman Spero Productions, Inc. concerning payment to performers on
said show, the parties entered into an Agreement
dated September 19, 1969.
3. As compensation to performers for service performed and as contributions to AFTRA Pension
& Welfare Funds, Herman Spero Productions, Inc.
owes, in uncontested claims, the sum of $35,871.75.

- 2 4. Herman Spero Productions, Inc. claim for return
of all or a portion of a $10,000 Security Bond
posted with AFTRA is denied. AFTRA is authorized
to use said Bond as an offset against what is
owed its members and what is owed the AFTRA Pension & Welfare Fund as set forth in item #3 above.
5. Accordingly Herman Spero Productions, Inc. is directed to pay forthwith to AFTRA on behalf of AFTRA
members owed compensation and on behalf of the
AFTRA Pension & Welfare Fund, the net sum of
$25,871.75 with interest, representing payment of
the uncontested claims herein.
6. The Arbitrator's fee of $500.00 shall be shared
equally by the parties. Therefore Herman Spero
Productions, Inc. shall also pay to AFTRA the sum
of $250.00 representing the Producer's share of
the Arbitrator's fee paid by AFTRA0
7.

The foregoing is without prejudice to the rights
of AFTRA to maintain an action against Herman
Spero Productions, Inc. on additional, and contested claims.

'Eric jy" Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: Augus t
19 7 2
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this /o day of August, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
Case No. 1330 1103 70
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 634 Printing Specialties and
Paper Products Union

and

Award

Inmont Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated October 15, 1969 and having been
duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The change in the shot mill operator's duties did
not constitute the introduction of a new type of
machinery within the meaning of Article XXXI Section
2 of the current agreement between the parties.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: May
1972
STATE OF New York )ss>.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of May, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

Case No. 1330 0941 71

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'

Local 634 Printing Specialties and
Paper Products Union

'
'

and
Inmont Corporation

'
'
i
'

Opinion

In accordance with Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated October 15, 1969 between Intnont Corporation,
hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Local 634 Printing Specialties and Paper Products Union, hereinafter referred
to as the "Union," the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Does the change in the Shot Mill Operator's duties
constitute the introduction of a new type of machinery within the meaning of Article XXXI Section 2
of the current agreement between the parties? If
so should the rate for the job be increased, and if
so by how much retroactive to October 22, 1970 (exclusive of the period May 14, 1970 to August 23, 1971).
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on January 19, 1972 at which time representatives of the Company and Union, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
Thereafter on February 9, 1972, accompanied by representatives of the parties, the Arbitrator made a plant visitation to
observe the job operation in question.
The parties filed post hearing briefs.
Article XXXI Section 2 reads:

- 2 If any new types of machines are introduced during
the term of this Agreement, the Company will notify
the Union as much in advance as possible and will
discuss any applicable rates. If no agreement has
been reached when such a machine is ready to operate, the Company will set tentative rates and all
rates finally set will be retroactive to the date
of the operation of the machine. If the Company
and the Union are unable to agree, rates will be
subject to arbitration in accordance with the grievance machinery contained herein.
The threshold question is whether the change in the Shot
Mill operation, by the introduction of a second "shot mill" or
grinder (with accompanying supporting equipment) constitutes a
new type of machine within the meaning of the foregoing contract clause.
In my view a "new type" of machine is not limited to a
totally new species not previously utilized in the factory.
Rather, a new type of machine can come into being by significant
modifications, changes or additions to existing equipment.

For

if this were not the case the Company could make substantial
changes in existing equipment by combining machinery or by multiplying existing equipment in such a way as to significantly
and unreasonably increase the duties, responsibilities and demand of an operator.

And under that circumstance neither the

operator (nor the Union on his behalf) could seek an adjustment
in pay during the life of the contract no matter how arduous or
significantly more difficult his job became as a result.
Therefore I conclude that the phrase "new type" of machinery includes modifications or changes in existing equipment
where the result is to significantly increase production or to
render the operator's job more demanding or more difficult,

- 3 physically or mentally.

In short both new machinery not prev-

iously employed and significant changes in existing equipment,
the effect of which is to significantly increase the obligations and demands of the operator beyond what they had been
when the wage rate was bargained, would warrant a new rate in
accordance with the procedures of the foregoing contract clause.
The question then is whether the undisputed change in
the shot mill operation met this test.

I conclude that it

did not.
The introduction of a second grinder with attendant supporting equipment, did not increase production.
manufactured, but no faster than before,,

Twice as much was

That quantity spent

twice as much time in the grinding operation

with the result

that no greater amount was produced within the allotted time.
Though the quality was better (and this was the purpose for the
second shot mill or grinder) the level of ultimate production,
based on the weight of the evidence before me, was only a restoration of the quantity produced earlier by the single shot
mill before an interim reduction designed to improve quality.
I do not see the significance of the Union's argument that
even if production was not increased the Company benefited
economically from the improvement in quality and that the operator should share in that economic benefit by a wage increase.
The fact is that the Company must either produce a quality
product or lose its customers.

The evidence indicates that

unless the quality of this product was improved the Company
stood to lose existing customers.

The improved quality mere-

- 4 ly retained the business which the Company previously had and
there is no evidence that new business and new profits were obtained because of an improved quality resulting from the double
grinding shot mill operation.
The Union has established that with the introduction of a
second grinder, the operator is now called upon to perform more
of the same duties he previously performed.

But added duties

does not automatically mean added difficulties or demand, either
physical or mental.

This job is not rated under a

traditional

job evaluation plan, so that its elements have not been evaluated by an objective point system.

Rather, as I see it, the

operator has been paid a negotiated contract rate for the performance of duties required in the operation of the shot mill
for the regular hours of his shift.

The introduction of addi-

tional duties within those regular hours does not necessarily
mean that his job is more difficult, more demanding, or significantly changed to the extent that a pay increase would be
warranted.
For example, though it is clear that the operator must
perform additional cleaning work, (such as the cleaning of magnetic screens) for three to five hours a week, there is no evidence that he does not have sufficient time within his regular
shift to perform that work; or that those additional duties interfere with any of his other responsibilities; or that he is
required to perform two or more sets of duties at the same time.
Also there is no evidence that this additional work constitutes
a significant increase in the physical demand of the job.

The

- 5same is true with regard to the observation of gauges, dials
and attention to additional valves.

The two grinders are posi-

tioned in close proximity and I cannot conclude that periodic
observation of an additional set of gauges, dials and valves,
albeit an additional duty, constitutes a significantly additional responsibility for the operator.
Also whether on a significant basis the operator is now required to dump and mix more bags of chemicals and other material into the mixing equipment, is not clear.

The operator

"thinks" he does, but it appears to me that he does so quite infrequently.

One and at times two additional batches are mixed

in a 48 hour period.

So considering the continuous nature of

this work, this additional duty will fall to any one operator
only from time to time.

Hence it cannot be deemed a significant

extra regular duty.
In summary, I do not find, based on the record before me
that there has been either a significant or unreasonable increase in the duties required of the shot mill operator during
his regular shift hours which would warrant an upward revision
of his present wage rate.
Absent a job evaluation plan under which the extent of
job complexities, demand and responsibilities can be objectively determined; and absent other evidence of an unreasonable increase in what is required and expected of an operator, either
physically or mentally, the mere increase in certain duties for
which there is ample time within the regular work shift, is not
enough to transform the changed job operation into a "new type

- 6 of machinery," warranting a new wage rate within the meaning
of Article XXXI Section 2 of the contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

f
'
!

Trustees Taxicab Industry Pension Fund;
Trustees Taxicab Industry Health &
Welfare Fund

'
'
'
i

and

'

lona Garage, Inc.

Award

'

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chariman under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Trustees;
the above named Company having failed to appear after due
notice, makes the following AWARD:
For the period March 2, 1971 to June 30, 1972 lona
Garage, Inc. owes the Taxicab Industry Pension Fund
the sum of $2700.67.
For the period March 2, 1971 to June 30, 1972 lona
Garage, inc. owes the Taxicab Industry Health &
Welfare Fund the sum of $6301.57
Said sums are past due. Therefore lona Garage, Inc.
is directed to pay the foregoing sums to said Funds
forthwith with interest.

Uric J/ Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: July
1972
STATE OF New York )ss<.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of July, 1972, before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the
individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Trustees, Taxicab Industry Pension Fund
Trustees, Taxicab Industry Health and
Welfare Fund
AWARD
and

Jaylen Operating Corp.

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman between the above
named parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the Trustees; the Employer failing to appear after due notice, makes the following AWARD:
For the period of March 2, 1971 through February
29, 1972 Jaylen Operating Corp. owes the Taxicab
Industry Pension Fund the sum of $17,818.74.
For the period March 2, 1971 through February 29,
1972 Jaylen Operating Corp. owes the Taxicab Industry Health & Welfare Fund the sum of $41,577.06.
The above sums are past due.

Therefore Jaylen Operating

Corp. is directed to pay said sums to said Funds forthwith with
interest.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York) ' * "
On this
day of
1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

-?v 13
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Association of Legal Aid Attorneys
and

'
'
i
'
t
'
t
'
i

Legal Aid Society

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated July 1, 1971 and having been
duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the Parties, Awards as follows:
1. The Society did not violate the grievance procedure of the contract by refusing to discuss
the "Attica grievance" after arbitration had
been demanded.
2. The Society did not violate Article V Section 3
of the contract by its letter of November 22,
1971 to Attica inmates without prior notice to or
consultation with certain staff attorneys.
3. There was not a settlement of the "Attica grievance" at Step 2 of the grievance procedure

"Eric /. Schmertz £
Arbitrator
DATED: August / 1972
STATE Of New York )Ss. :
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of August, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 1330 0294 72

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'

Association of Legal Aid Attorneys '
1

and

Opinion

'

Legal Aid Society

The stipulated issues are:
1. Whether the Society violated the grievance
procedure of the contract by refusing to discuss the "Attica grievance" after arbitration
had been demanded?
2. Whether the Society violated Article V Section
3 of the contract by its letter of November 22,
1971 to Attica inmates without prior notice to or
consultation with certain staff attorneys?
3. Was there a settlement of the Attica grievance
at Step 2 of the grievance procedure? If so is
it binding on the Society?
A hearing was held on July 7, 1972 at which time representatives of the Association and the Society appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses,
I find it more logical and orderly to deal with Issue 3
first, and then issues 1 and 2 0
I find no settlement of the grievance at Step 2.

I do not

see how Mr. Hellerstein could have unequivocally "promised" to
send a second letter to the prisoners at Attica, and at the
same time advise the staff attorneys that he would discuss their
request for such a letter with Mr. Carr, the Society's Attorney
in Chief.

Carr was Hellerstein's superior.

By stating that

- 2 the objections of the staff attorneys to the letter of November 22, 1971 would be discussed or taken up with him (a statement not disputed by the Association), Hellerstein must have
meant that Carr's approval was necessary before any second explanatory letter could be prepared and sent to the prisoners.
This clearly negates any express promise or assurance by
Hellerstein that another letter in fact would be transmitted,,
I cannot find, as a matter of contract breach, that the
Society violated the grievance procedure by refusing to discuss the grievance after arbitration had been demanded.

The

Society's contractual obligation is to follow the grievance
procedure; to hold meetings at the various steps of that procedure; and to accord the Association full opportunity to present its grievance during each step of the grievance procedure.
But ones that procedure has been exhausted, both substantively
and chronologically, and the Association has initiated its
last step, namely demanding arbitration, there is no further
obligation to return to a preliminary step and again hold a
grievance meeting on the issue unless both sides voluntarily
agree to do soa

A demand for arbitration is notice that the

prior steps of the grievance procedure have been complied with,
exhausted or waived, and that the grievance is ready for the
terminal step of arbitration.

This is not to say that it is

wise as a matter of good labor relations for an employer not
to again discuss a grievance after arbitration has been demanded, but only that he is not again required to do so, provided
as here, the grievance procedure was previously employed, its

- 3 steps complied with, and arbitration demanded,,
I do not find that the Society violated Article V Section
3 by its letter of November 22, 1971 to Attica inmates without
prior notice to or consultation with certain staff attorneys.
My decision is based on a limited ground, namely that the
work of the staff attorneys, in interviewing and counseling
Attica inmates subsequent to the uprising, did not establish as
between those inmates and the attorneys, an attorney-client relationship within the meaning of Article V Section 3 of the contract.
The work at Attica was of short duration - a. matter of days.
The undisputed testimony of Hellerstein was that it was under
his active supervision, at least so far as the Society's staff
attorneys were concerned.

For the most part individual prison-

ers were seen only once and for a very short period in any
single day.

Also undisputed is Hellerstein's testimony that he

instructed the staff to advise the inmates interviewed that they
could not again expect to see the same attorney.

Moreover, the

work at Attica by the Society and its staff attorneys was in conjunction with similar work undertaken by the legal branches of
"t"
other groups, The work was integrated on a cooperative basis
among these various groups for the purpose not of representing
inmates either individually or collectively in any actual or
potential proceeding against them, but solely to inform them of
their general rights with regard to certain upcoming governmental investigations of the uprising„
In other words, I do not find that any prisoners had "an

- 4individual staff attorney ... assigned to his cause" within
the meaning of Article V Section 3 of the contract.

Nor do I

find that there was a "case" on behalf of any of the prisoners
within the staff attorneys' "ambit of responsibility."
Accordingly, because the circumstances of this particular
situation do not meet the conditions and requirements of Article
V Section 3 of the contract, the Society had no contractual obligation to give notice to or consult with the staff attorneys
before discussions with the FBI and the preparation and sending of the letter of November 22, 1971.

This is not to say

that it is either wise or good personnel practice not to involve
staff attorneys in such matters, but only that as a matter of
contract, the Society, in this instance, was not required to
do so.

Eric Y. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO
and

AWARDS

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc,
on behalf of certain Members

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman between the above
named parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of said parties makes the following AWARDS:
The grievance of Leonard Wilkins against Jackson
Maintenance for break-down pay for February 3, 1970
is granted. The grievant's testimony that the night
dispatcher told him that no other cars were available after: his car was towed back to the garage,
stands unrebutted. Accordingly Jackson Maintenance
shall pay the grievant break-down pay calculated in
accordance with Article XIII of the contract,,
The grievance of James Nelson against Cab Operating
for 50% commission retroactive to January 29, 1968
and for a third week of vacation pay for the vacation years 1967-1968, 1968-1969 and 1969-1970 is denied. I hold that the grievant could and should have
taken steps, considerably earlier, to establish his
prior service in the Industry,
The petition of Circle Maintenance Corp. to discharge
Robert Lowich is granted. I find that on May 5, 1971
Lowich initiated and led an unauthorized work stoppage
in violation of Article XXIV of the contract. I have
repeatedly stated in prior Awards and rulings that a
violation of Article XXIV especially as here, by an
employee with special responsibility to uphold as
well as administer all provisions of the contract,
including the "no-strike" and arbitration clauses
constitutes cause for summary discharge.
The grievance of Ernest Stark
in the course of the hearing,
vacation pay in the amount of
two vacation payments in each
pute.

against AAR was settled
in payment of one week's
1/2 of the average of the
of the two years in dis-

- 2 The grievance of Monroe Newman against Helen Garage for .additional vacation pay for the vacation
year 1969-1970 is denied. I hold that credit for
"disability" days within the meaning of Article XII
of the contract is for those days which an employee
receives disability benefits. Here thfe grievant
claimed but was denied disability benefits,
The grievance of Sid Cherna against Ike Garage for
an additional 1% commission from May 5, 1960; 50%
of a third week of vacation pay for the vacation
year 1969-1970 and for a full second and third week
vacation pay for 1970-1971 is granted. I find that
on February 16, 1970 the grievant did not terminate
his employment, but rather changed his status from
full time to part time driver. I also hold that on
May 5, 1970 when he resumed work full time he was not
a new employee. For the same reasons set forth in my
Award of November 1, 1971 in the grievance of Al Sysler
against Cordi Garage, the private written agreement
entered into by the grievant and representatives of the
Employer is not enforceable. Accordingly I find no
break in the grievant's service with this Employer
since he began work for this garage in May 1965.
Accordingly considering his prior employment elsewhere
he has accumulated the requisite 15 or more years in
the Industry, the last three of which have been with
his present Employer. He therefore meets the requirements for three weeks vacation with pay under Article
XII Section l(b) of the contract, and he was so qualified for the vacation years 1969-1970 and 1970-1971.
As it is undisputed that he worked 206 days during the
former vacation year and over 230 in the latter vacation year, he is entitled to the amounts of vacation
pay as claimed.
Based on my foregoing holding that he did not terminate his employment on February 16, 1971 or any time
thereafter, and was not a new hire on May 5, 1970, I
find that he also meets the eligibility requirements
for the additional 1% commission (50%) from May 5, 1970.
As of that date he was a full time taxi driver, and he had
had at least 10 years of Industry-wide seniority, the
last 3 years of which were in the present garage.

Eric /J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

- 3 -

DATED: January /ifl972
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)

ss..

On this /! day of January, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same0

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

t
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO
Award
and
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade
on behalf of certain Members

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman between the above
named parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of said Parties, makes the following AWARD;
The grievance of M. Rivera against Helen Garage
was withdrawn from^arbitration.
™
The grievance c^ Ramps against Dynamic Garage
(Eden) is dismissed with prejudice because of
failure of the grievant to appear at the hearings on August 10 and August 23, 1972 after
due notice.
The grievance of Harry Gonz ales against Gore
Garage (Eden) was settled during the hearing.
Without prejudice to the positions of the parties,
the Employer is to pay the grievant the sum of
$28.80 in full settlement of the grievant's claim.
The grievances of Felix Santiago, Fredy Re in o so,,
Angelo Sant±agcy, Varciso Pena and Juan Bou against
Gore Garage (Eden) are dismissed with prejudice
because of the failure of said grievants to appear
at the hearings on August 10 and August 23, 1972
after due notice.
The grievance of^J^Garagolo against Tone Operating
is granted as follows:
The grievant's discharge is reversed on procedural grounds. In a previous Award regarding
grounds for discharge for "low bookings" I
ruled that a "progressive discipline"formula
must be followed. And that before the penalty
of discharge for "low bookings" was proper,
the affected employee must be first given a
written warning and then suspended. Neither
was done in the instant case (although the
grievant was warned orally. )

~ 2 That this discharge took place prior to the
aforementioned Award does not mean that the
"progressive discipline" formula is waived.
Accordingly the discharge shall be expunged
from the grievant's personnel record. He
shall not be reinstated because he does not
seek reinstatement. However he is entitled
to whatever benefits he would have received
had he not been discharged, except back pay
for the five days between the date of his discharge and his re-employment elsewhere. I
find that during those five days he made no
effort to seek employment elsewhere and hence
he is not entitled to pay for those days lost.
The grievance of I. Cook against Jofan Garage is
denied. It is undisputed that the Employer was reluctant to hire the grievant because of the grievant's prior difficulties at other garages, and only
did so on the urging of a Union official to give
the grievant "a chance." Therefore in view of that
circumstance I cannot now believe that the Employer
would falsely testify about the subsequent difficulties he had with the grievant. I am satisfied
that his testimony, at least in substantial or significant part was accurate. It disclosed an irreconcilable incompatibility between the grievant and the
Employer, for which I find the grievant primarily responsible, and which negates a continuation of that
employee-employer relationship. Accordingly there
was just cause for the grievant's discharge^x

Schmertz
Impar/cial Chairman
DATED: September 5, 1972
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 5th day of September, 1972,
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me
me to be the individual described in and
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
the same.
\

before me personally
known and known to
who executed the
to me thatrhe executed

KO
'.• *-' j * .-~ - *
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY
In the matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 3036 New York City taxi
Drivers Union, AFL-CIO
and

Award

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on behalf of Cornell, Circle and Iota
Garages

The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman between the above
named parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of said parties makes the following AWARD:
The grievance of B. Portney against Circle Garage
and the grievance of D. Zugar against Iota Garage
were settled during the course of the hearing.
The grievance of A. Kassler against Cornell Garage
over a split vacation for 1970-1971 is denied.
Though the grievant had some difficulty with some
managerial personnel for which he may not have been
at fault, I do not find that it reached the level
of "harassment."

Eric y;Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: August
1972
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of August, 1972 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,,

JMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between'
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO
Opinions

and

and
Awards

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on behalf of certain Members

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman between the above
named parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties at hearings on November 29 and December 6,
1972, renders the following Opinions and Awards:
The grievances of E. Brown et al vs. Clinton Garage for
Christmas bonuses for the years 1970 and 1971 are granted.
Pursuant to my authority under Article XXV Section 2
Step 1, the Union is excused from its failure to timely file
its grievance for Christmas bonus for _
1970. (Its grievance for
Christmas bonus for 1971 was filed and/or made known to the
~
Employer in timely fashion.) I conclude that forebearance
caused the Union and the employees to withhold a formal grievance covering the 1970 Christmas bonus claim - to give the
Employer a chance to improve his economic status.

But I am

satisfied that the Union and the employees did not intend thereby to waive the 1970 bonus.

When the Employer failed again to

pay a Christmas bonus in 1971 it was appropriate for the Union
and the employees to grieve for both years.
Article XXXIX (Christmas Bonus) reads:

- 2 The Employer shall continue to pay Christmas
bonus to inside service, maintenance and other
personnel covered by the terms and provisions
of this Agreement, if the Employer paid such
bonus as a matter of past practice.
Despite his denial, I find that the Employer did have a
past practice of paying Christmas bonus.
grievants in 1968 and again in 1969.

He paid it to the

I am satisfied that those

payments in each of those two preceding years constitute a
practice, requiring its continuation, within the meaning of
Article XXXIX of the contract.

Accordingly the Employer is

directed to pay to the grievants Christmas bonuses for each of
the years 1970 and 1971 in the amounts he paid each grievant
in the year 1969.

The grievances of E. Veve and J. Silvestry against Metro
are granted to the following extent:
The Employer, despite his good intentions to train and
introduce new "inside" personnel into the industry, did not
have the unilateral right to employ "trainees" to perform work
within the classification of Bodyman-Helper at a wage rate less
than the contract rate for that classification.
Accordingly from the time the grievants commenced work on
a full time basis in July 1972 until they were laid off in
early September 1972 they should have been paid the BodymanHelper' s contract rate.

The Employer shall pay them the differ-

ence between what they received and the contract rate of Bodyman-Helper for that period of time.

(This does not apply to

the month of June 1972, when the grievants worked only part
« time while still attending school.)

- 3 The Employer has the right to lay off employees for lack
of work.

I am satisfied that in September 1972 when the griev-

ants were laid off, the Employer did so not solely because the
Union demanded the contract rate of pay, but also because they
were surplus and notneeded as Bodyman-Helpers.

In other words

I find that because the Employer could not continue them as
trainees, their services were not needed in any other capacity
to handle the available work in the shop, and hence their layoffs were proper.

The discharge of C. Woldenberg by Iota Garage is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension.

Based on the evidence before me

I am persuaded that the grievant was discharged because of an
accident, and that the charge that he cut the meter wire arose
for the first time subsequent to his termination.

It is well

settled that the propriety of a discharge turns on the reason
~
for the discharge at the time that the discharge is effectuated.
This is not to say that subsequent to the discharge an employer
may not conduct an investigation and collect evidence in support
of the reason why the employee was fired.

But he cannot fire

an employee for one reason, and thereafter develop new and
different reasons to support the discharge. (Of course where an
employee has been discharged for one particular reason, new and
different charges disclosed or developed after that discharge,
though not supportive of that discharge, may be grounds for a
new action against the employee including a subsequent discharge.)
Here I conclude that the grievant was fired as soon as

- 4 the Dispatcher saw that a new cab had been damaged.

Later it

was discovered that the meter wire was cut and the grievant was
accused of that offense on a later day.
In prior decisions I have made clear that cutting a meter
wire is a dischargeable offense, irrespective of the employee's
past record.

But here the charge of cutting the meter wire

post-dated the grievant's discharge and simply was not the
reason he was firedp and though material to a subsequent disciplinary penalty which the Employer may impose on this grievant, is not relevant to the instant discharge.
I am not prepared to hold in this case, considering the
nature of the particular accident involved, that the penalty
of summary dismissal is warranted.

So far as the record be-

fore me is concerned there is no evidence that the grievant
had prior accidents.

(Though by his own admission he had had

one working elsewhere since his discharge.)
The appropriate penalty in my judgment under the particular facts in this case, without establishing a precedent for
any other case, is a disciplinary suspension.

Accordingly if

he chooses to do so the grievant is entitled to be reinstated
by this Employer but without back pay.

And the period of time

between his discharge and his reinstatement shall be deemed a
disciplinary penalty for the accident.
However the rights of the parties regarding the allegations of a cut meter wire are expressly reserved and as indicated, no determination of that charge is made herein.

- 5 The grievance of Seymour Liebowitz vs. Tone Garage was
settled by and between the parties.

Eric A. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: December 29, 1972
STATE of New York )
COUNTY OF New York) " "
On this 29th day of December, 1972, before me
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
the same.

personally
known to me
the foreexecuted

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO

Award

and
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc. '
on behalf of 57th Street Management, Inc. '
The stipulated issue is:
Is the Equalization Award of the Impartial Chairman
dated February 4, 1969 applicable to the grievances
herein? If so to what extent and with what remedy,
if any?
The grievants, Messrs. James Johnson, Antonio Bermudez,
Otis Davis, Eurique Diaz, Eurique Cruz and Juan Garcia, all
classified as Bodymen, seek both equalization of pay amongst
themselves and with three more senior Bodymen, namely Messrs.
Thomas Hughes, Raymond Gracteroly and Lynn Peterson.
A hearing was held on August 23, 1972 at which time the
grievants and representatives of the Union and Employer appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
My Equalization Award of February 4, 1969 held it to be an
inequity and subject to correction where:
"An employee is paid less than some other employee(s)
in the same classification, though he is of substantially equal or greater seniority and possesses relatively equal or greater skills and performs substantially the same or more difficult work."
I ruled that in such a situation the pay of the former shall
be increased to the level of the latter for the period of time
vsuch

condition obtained, retroactive to January 29, 1969.

- 2 All the foregoing named employees occupy the Bodyman
classification.

There is no evidence that they are not rela-

tively equal in skill.

There is no evidence that they do not

perform substantially the same work.

Therefore it is on the

remaining standard, namely seniority, that the answer to the
stipulated issue turns.
Among the grievants themselves, Messrs. Davis, Diaz, Cruz
and Garcia are all paid alike.

The question is whether any or

all of them should be increased to the higher level of Bermudez
(who receives 5% more effective 11/17/69,) or to the level of
Johnson who receives 15% more (5% effective 1/29/68, 5% effective 11/17/68 and 5% effective 11/17/69.) And additionally whether Bermudez is entitled to be raised to the level of Johnson.
The answer depends upon the meaning of "substantially equal
seniority" within the meaning of my Equalization Award of February 4, 1969.

I now interpret that phrase to mean six months

or less; or in other words where employees' dates of seniority
with the same employer are six or less months apart, they are
"substantially equal in seniority,"

within the meaning of my

Equalization Award.
On this basis none of the grievants qualify for equalization of their pay with any other employee of this employer similarly classified.

Bermudez is from nine months to twenty-three

months senior to Messrs. Davis, Diaz, Cruz and Garcia, so the
latter four are not eligible to be increased to Bermudez' level.
And Johnson is more than sixteen months senior to Bermudez, so
the latter is not eligible to be increased to Johnson's pay
level.

- 3 Manifestly therefore none of the grievants are entitled
to be raised to the level of Messrs. Hughes, Gracteroly and
Peterson.

The latter three employees enjoy seniority with this

employer which predates 1966.

The grievants are from two to

five years junior.
This is not to say that because the grievants are paid incentive rates, and by consequence achieve earnings in excess of
the contract rate, my Equalization Award does not apply.

Had

the criteria of the Equalization Award been met the fact that
this employer's incentive system generates higher pay levels
would not have barred application of the principles of that
Award.
Accordingly the Undersigned as Impartial Chairman between
the above named parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of said parties, makes the following Award:
The grievances of James Johnson, Antonio Bermudez,
Otis Davis, Eurique Diaz, Eurique Cruz and Juan
Garcia for equalization of pay pursuant to the Impartial
Chairman's Equalization Award of February 4, 1969 are
denied.

Eric <&! Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: September
1972
STATE OF New York )ss> .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of September, 1972 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORIES INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 IATSE
and
Movielab, Inc.

Award
and
Opinion

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company pay the following Timers the proper
rate of severance pay when they were laid off in
March 1971? James Sills, Michael Parella, Angelo
Russo, Gene Zippo, Ronald Ergen, Peter DiMarco,
Stellios Zacharopoulos. If not what shall be the
remedy?
I interpret the word "week(s)" under the column headed
Severance Pay in Section 11 (a) of the contract to mean the
actual pay which the affected employee was receiving when laid
off or terminated under the provisions of that Section.
Up to their layoff the grievants had been receiving a
weekly rate of pay in excess of the contract or "book rate."
In other words their rates of pay were "red circled."

It is

the red circled rate which constituted their actual weekly compensation, and it is that pay to which they were entitled when
laid off.

The Company erred when it paid them the weekly

"book rate" only.
Accordingly, the Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named
parties, and having heard the proofs and allegations of the
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not pay the grievants the proper
rate of severance pay when they were laid off in
March 1971. The Company shall pay them the differ-

- 2 ence between the "book rate" and the "red circled"
weekly compensation which they had been receiving
up to the time of their layoff in accordance with
the schedule set forth in Section 11(a) of the
contract.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company

Eric J/ Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: May / 1972
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this * day of May, 1972 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION

ANTHONY SODANC, LOUIS SODANC,
ALEX CELI, JOEK NORELLI and
JOSEPH ANDIOLA

and

AWARD

- and -

PABST BREWING COMPANY
-x

Arbitrator:

Eric J. Schmertz

Hearings:

Newark, New Jersey
September 23, 1969
November 19, 1970
June 12, 1972

Appearances

Company
Stryker, Tarns & Dill
by John C. Lifland, Esq.
33 Washington Street
Newark, N.J. 07102
Grlevants
Craner & Brennan
by John A. Craner, Esq.
1143 East Jersey Street
Elizabeth, N.J. 07201
Local 153
Nicholas Buydos, President
James Marion, Shop Steward
New Jersey Brewers' Association
Thomas J. Hayes

\l of the grievants in this matter were

for lengthy periods of time by Krueger Brewing Company (ITKruager")
and were in the employ of Krueger when that company went out of
business at a time shortly before February,1961.

All were members

of Local 153, Brewery Workers Joint Local Executive Board of New
Jersey ("Local 153") throughout the period of their employment at
Krueger as well as the precise period with which we are here concerned.

Under the terms of Section 4.3-1(a) of the contract between

Local 153 and various members of the New Jersey Brewers' Association
("Association") including Pabst Brewing Company ("Pabst") grievants
were thus Regular Employees; Section 4.3-1(a) reads, in pertinent
part, as follows:
"4.3-1(a) Regular employees are those employees, under the
jurisdiction of Local 153 listed at the Office of the
Association on the Joint Executive Board Regular Employee
List dated March 15, 1957, or must have worked for the
same Company under the jurisdiction of Local 153 for
225 days in any period of 52 consecutive weeks after
June 1, 1964 to attain regular employee status and be
added to such List..."
This status of Regular Employee on the books of the Association gives an employee certain rights to employment and reemployment in the event of lay-off not only with the company for
which he works but with other companies in the Association.

When

a Regular Employee resigns from his job with an Association member
or when, as in this case, the member company by which he has been
employed goes out of business, he becomes an Unattached Regular
Employee; as such he has the right to be hired ahead of casual,

-1-

extra and Junior Regular Employees by any Association member which
has job openings.

It was in this status of Unattached Regular

Employees that grievants commenced working for Pabst at various
dates between February 1, 1961 and March 3, 1961.

No regular

*/..

five-day week job openings were available at Pabst at that time
and they obtained work by shaping up at the Local 153 union hall
and subsequently through direct contact at Pabst on a day-to-day
basis.

A substantial amount of the work accepted by each of the

grievants during the ensuing twelve to fifteen month period was
not under the jurisdiction of Local 153 but under Local 843,
another local of the Brewery Workers Joint Board.

The testimony

of the witness Buydos is to the effect that grievants preferred working
under the Local 843 jurisdiction because they could work days
instead of working at night as they would have to have done on
Local 153 work.

Although this testimony is contested by grievants,

its credibility is enhanced by the fact - conceded by the grievants
and established by litigation which reached the National Labor
Relations Board - that grievants made considerable efforts over
an extended period of time to transfer their union membership
from Local 153 to Local 843.

I think it more than coincidence that

grievants took steps "to protect ourselves" with regard to seniority
rights as Local 153 employees of Pabst only when their attempts to
transfer to Local 843 were at the point of failure and at a time

when opportunities for free-lance work in the Local 843 juris-

-2-

diction were becoming increasingly

unavailable.

Whatever their motivations and intentions may have been,
however, the fact is that they made no attempt, knowledge of
which may be charged to Pabst, to establish their status as
Regular Employees of Pabst until May of 1962 when they filed
letters of intent, as prescribed by Section 4.5-3 of the contract, to be placed on the Regular Employee seniority list.

Section

4.5-3 reads as follows:
"4.5-3 An unattached regular employee (not on a
seniority list of another Company), who held such
status prior to June 1, 1964 or more than two (2)
years upon written notice to the Personnel Department
of the Company in which he is employed, shall have
the right to be placed on the regular employee
seniority list of that Company ai d his seniority
date shall be his most recent starting date with
such Company."
Grievants were thereafter placed on the seniority list for
Local 153 employees with seniority dates which eliminated most or
all of the time worked prior to the filing of the letters of intent - the "written notification" required by Section 4.5-3 in May 1962.

They maintain that their seniority should have dated

from the respective February and March 1961 dates when they first
shaped up for work at Pabst and regardless of whether the work
they performed in the ensuing period until the filing of their
letters of intent was in the Local 153 or Local 843 jurisdiction.
This claim carries with it the implicit contention that breaks in
continuity of their employment during this period (and the unrefuted
testimony of the witness Jacknain establishes that there were such

-3-

breaks in the employment of each of the grievants) should also be
ignored.
Section 4.5-3 of the contract clearly contemplates the
situation, comparable to that of the grievants, in which a Regular
Employee on the books of the Association leaves the employ of
one Association member, whether by resignation or lay-off, goes
to work for another Association member without becoming a fulltime, five-day-a-week employee and thereafter does become a fiveday-a-week employee, signifying that he wishes to be added to
the seniority list of the company in the bargaining unit in which
he is employed.

When he does so, the Section provides, his

seniority is back-dated to his most recent starting date and that
itiis the latest such date that will be used.

The contract does

not spell out the meaning of this distinction nor clearly show
how an employee might have two or more starting dates but the
testimony of two witnesses, one the President of the union and
the other a representative of the Company who are the parties to
the contract in question, makes it abundantly clear.

The testimony

of these two witnesses, Buydos and Jacknain, respectively, shows
that when a man is employed in any capacity other than that of a
regularly scheduled five-day-a-week employee, be he an unattached
regular, an extra or a casual employee, any break in the con-

-4-

tinuity of his employment, even if for only one day and regardless of whether it is due to illness, lack of work or for any
other reason, results in a loss of the time previously worked
for all purposes; the next day that he works is his most recent
starting date.

After an employee has been added to the roster

this condition changes and absences from work, unless they exceed the -prescribed requirements with regard to duration or
justification, have no adverse affect on the employees' job
tenure or continuity for various purposes including those of
seniority.
The record shows further that the grievants worked

during

the approximately fifteen month period in question here for the
most part outside of the jurisdiction of Local 153 and that during
that same period there were days when they did not work at all
including one day shortly before the filing of their letters of
intent to accept regular employment status as Local 153 employees
of Pabst.

Thus, even if there were validity to their contention

that all employment with Pabst regardless of whether in the
Local 153 or the Local 843 jurisdiction

should be credited to them,

there would be the matter of breaks in continuity of their employment on days when they did not work at all.
Grievants argue that their work both in the Local 843 and the
Local 153 jurisdiction during the subject period should be counted
in establishing their seniority "since it is the employer that one
looks to, not the Union, in determining seniority".

-5-

This is over-

simplification.

One may look to the employer for the ministerial

acts which establish and record one's seniority and one certainly
looks to the employer for certain of the benefits flowing from
seniority.

But one also looks to the unit in which that seniority

is to operate; and one surely looks to the contract obtained by
the collective bargaining representative of that unit to determine
whether the concept of seniority exists in the shop, if so, how it
is obtained and, once obtained, how it operates.
I find nothing in the contract nor in the testimony and evidence before me in this matter to support the view that a man may
avoid the low seniority assignments which would be his as a fulltime employee in the unit of which he is a member during the
early years of his employment with a company; that he may instead
perform non-unit work of a more desirable nature; and that he

may

thereafter take equal place in the seniority roster of his unit
with men who, during the same period, have performed only unit
work gradually working from less desirable to!"more desirable
work assignments and other improved conditions attributable to
their earned seniority in the unit.

Nor am I persuaded that

equity would be served by such a conclusion.
result that grievants seek.

Yet that is the

That the contract between Local

153 and Pabst is distinct from its contract with Local 843, although they appear in the same booklet; that the rights and
duties of Local 153 employees of Pabst derive exclusively from
the Local 153 contract; and that the seniority rights which

— 6—

grlevants invoke are a matter in which Pabst, Local 153 and the
grievants all have interests which are entitled to consideration
are points clearly established by the first tv/o provisions of
the contract, Sections 0.1 and 0.2 which read as follows:
"0.1 This Agreement shall be binding upon the Union
and each of the above-named Locals and the Association
and the above-named Companies. The liability of the
Association and of any Company and of any Union and of
any Local hereunder and the responsibility of the Association and of any such Company or of the Union and of
and Local for its compliance with the provisions of
this Agreement shall be several, and not joint.
"O.2 Unless otherwise provided herein to the contrary
"employees" as used in this Agreement shall be construed
to refer to the employees of the Companies who are parties to this Agreement in the unit for which the Union
was certified by the National Labor Relations Board on
March 9, 1953."
Based upon the transcript of testimony and the evidence forming the record herein and having considered the respective posthearing briefs of the parties, I find and conclude that:
1. beginning on various dates between February 1, 1961
and March 3, 1961 and until their filing of letters of
intent to become regular employees of Pabst on a
regularly scheduled basis, grievants were unattached
regular employees working on an irregular basis both
in regard to continuity of days worked for Pabst
and with respect to their performance of both unit
work and non-unit work during the approximately
fifteen month period here in question;
2. that their "most recent starting dates" as contemplated by Section 4.5-3 of the contract between Local
153 and Pabst was the first day of the most recent
period of unbroken and uninterrupted employment with
Pabst immediately preceding their respective filings
of letters of intent to become regularly scheduled
Pabst employees in the unit represented by Local 153.

—7—

Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the parties makes the following AWARD:

Pabst Brewing Company did not violate its collective
bargaining agreement with Local 153 by failing to base
grievants' respective seniority dates upon their respective earliest employment dates with the company. The
seniority dates assigned are appropriate and are in
accordance with the said collective bargaining agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December
1972
STATE OF: New York)
COUNTY OF New York) ' " "
On this
day of December, 1972 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same

-8-
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Arbitrator:

Eric J. Schmertz

Hearings:

Newark, New Jersey
September 23, 1969
November 19, 1970
June 12, 1972

Appearances:

Company ,
Stryker, Tarns & Dill
by John C. Lifland, Esq.
33 Washington Street
Newark, N.J. 07102
Grievants
Craner & Brennan
by John A. Craner, Esq.
1143 East Jersey Street
Elizabeth, N.J. 07201
Local 153
Nicholas Buydos, President
James Marion, Shop Steward
New Jersey Brewers' Association
Thomas J. Hayes

All of the grievants In this matter were formerly employed
for lengthy periods of time by Krueger Brewing Company ("Krueger")
and were in the employ of Krueger when that company went out of
business at a time shortly before Februaryr1961.

All were members

of Local 153, Brewery Workers Joint Local Executive Board of New
Jersey ("Local 153") throughout the period of their employment at
Krueger as well as the precise period with which we are here concerned.

Under the terms of Section 4.3-1(a) of the contract between

Local 153 and various members of the New Jersey Brewers' Association
("Association") including Pabst Brewing Company ("Pabst") grievants
were thus Regular Employees; Section 4.3-1(a) reads, in pertinent
part, as follows:
"4.3-1 (a) Regular employees are those employees, under the
jurisdiction of Local 153 listed at the Office of the
Association on the Joint Executive Board Regular Employee
List dated March 15, 1957, or must have worked for the
same Company under the jurisdiction of Local 153 for
225 days in any period of 52 consecutive weeks after
June 1, 1964 to attain regular employee status and be
added to such List..."
This status of Regular Employee on the books of the Association gives an employee certain rights to employment and reemployment in the event of lay-off not only with the company for
which he works but with other companies in the Association.

When

a Regular Employee resigns from his job with an Association member
or when, as in this case, the member company by which he has been
employed goes out of business, he becomes an Unattached Regular
Employee; as such he has the right to be hired ahead of casual,
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extra and Junior Regular Employees by any Association member which
has job openings.

It was in this status of Unattached Regular
\s

dates between February 1, 1961 and March 3, 1961.

that grie

No regular

five-day week job openings were available at Pabst at that time
and they obtained work by shaping up at the Local 153 union hall
and subsequently through direct contact at Pabst on a day-to-day
basis.

A substantial amount of the work accepted by each of the

grievants during the ensuing twelve to fifteen month period was
not under the jurisdiction of Local 153 but under Local 843,
another local of -the Brewery Workers Joint Board.

The testimony

of the witness Buydos is to the effect that grievants preferred working
under the Local 843 jurisdiction because they could work days
instead of working at night as they would have to have done on
Local 153 work.

Although this testimony is contested by grievants,

its credibility is enhanced by the fact - conceded by the grievants
and established by litigation which reached the National Labor
Relations Board - that grievants made considerable efforts over
an extended period of time to transfer their union membership
from Local 153 to Local 843.

I think it more than coincidence that

grievants took steps "to protect ourselves" with regard to seniority
rights as Local 153 employees of Pabst only when their attempts to
transfer to Local 843 were at the point of failure and at a time
when opportunities for free-lance work in the Local 843 juris-
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diction were becoming increasingly unavailable.
Whatever their motivations and intentions may have been,

\, the fact

which may be charged to Pabst, to establish their status as
Regular Employees of Pabst until May of 1962 when they filed
letters of intent, as prescribed by Section 4.5-3 of the contract, to be placed on the Regular Employee seniority list.

Section

4.5-3 reads as follows:
"4.5-3 An unattached regular employee (not on a
seniority list of another Company), who held such
status prior to June 1, 1964 or more than two (2)
years upon written notice to the Personnel Department
of the Company in which he is employed, shall have
the right to be placed on the regular employee
seniority list of that Company m d his seniority
date shall be his most recent starting date with
such Company."
Grievants were thereafter placed on the seniority list for
Local 153 employees with seniority dates which eliminated most or
all of the time worked prior to the filing of the letters of intent - the "written notification" required by Section 4.5-3 in May 1962.

They maintain that their seniority should have dated

from the respective February and March 1961 dates when they first
shaped up for work at Pabst and regardless of whether the work
they performed in 'the ensuing period until the filing of their
letters of intent was in the Local 153 or Local 843 jurisdiction.
This claim carries with it the implicit contention that breaks in
continuity of their employment during this period (and the unrefuted
testimony of the witness Jacknain establishes that there were such
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breaks in the employment of each of the grievants) should also!be
ignored.
Section 4.5-3 of the contract clearly contemplates the

\, compar

Employee on the books of the Association leaves the employ of
one Association member, whether by resignation or lay-off, goes
to work for another Association member without becoming a fulltime, five-day-a-week employee and thereafter does become a fiveday-a-week employee, signifying that he wishes to be added to
the seniority list of the company in the bargaining unit in which
he is employed. When he does so, the Section provides, his
seniority is back-dated to his most recent starting date and that
itiis the latest such date that will be used.

The contract does

not spell out the meaning of this distinction nor clearly show
how an employee might have two or more starting dates but the
testimony of two witnesses, one the President of the union and
the other a representative of the Company who are the parties to
the contract in question, makes it abundantly clear.

The testimony

of these two witnesses, Buydos and Jacknain, respectively, shows
that when a man is employed in any capacity other than that of a
regularly scheduled five-day-a-week employee, be he an unattached
regular, an extra or a casual employee, any break in the con-
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tinuity of his employment, even if for only one day and regard|
less of whether it is due to illness, lack of work or for any
other reason, results in a loss of the time previously worked
for all purposes; the next day that he works is his most recent
starting date.

After an employee has been added to the roster

this-condition changes and absences from work, unless they exceed the^prescribed requirements with regard to duration or
justification, have no adverse affect on the employees' job
tenure or continuity for various purposes including those of
seniority.
The record shows further that the grievants worked during
the approximately fifteen month period in question here for the
most part outside of the jurisdiction of Local 153 and that during
that same period there were days when they did not work at all
including one day shortly before the filing of their letters of
intent to accept regular employment status as Local 153 employees
of Pabst.

Thus, even if there were validity to their contention

that all employment with Pabst regardless of whether in the
Local 153 or the Local 843 jurisdiction should be credited to them,
there would be the matter of breaks in continuity of their employment on days when they did not work at all.
Grievants argue that their work both in the Local 843 and the
Local 153 jurisdiction during the subject period should be counted
in establishing their seniority "since it is the employer that one
looks to, not the Union, in determining seniority',1.
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This is over-

simplification.

One may look to the employer for the ministerial

acts which establish and record one's seniority and one certainly
looks to the employer for certain of the benefits flowing from
seniority.

But one also looks to the unit in which that seniority

is to operate; and .one surely looks to the contract obtained by
the collective bargaining representative of that unit to determine
whether the concept of seniority exists in the shop, if so, how it
is obtained and, once obtained, how it operates.
I find nothing in the contract nor in the testimony and evidence before me in this matter to support the view that a man may
avoid the low seniority assignments which would be his as a fulltime employee in the unit of which he is a member during the
early years of his employment with a company; that he may instead
perform non-unit work of a more desirable nature; and that he

may

thereafter take equal place in the seniority roster of his unit
with men who, during the same period, have performed only unit
work gradually working from less desirable to more desirable
work assignments and other improved conditions attributable to
their earned seniority in the unit.

Nor am I persuaded that

equity would be served by such a conclusion.
result that grievants seek.

Yet that is the

That the contract between Local

153 and Pabst is distinct from its contract with Local 843, although they appear in the same booklet; that the rights and
t

duties of Local 153 employees of Pabst derive exclusively from
the Local 153 contract;'and that the seniority rights which

-6-

grievants invoke are a matter in which Pabst, Local 153 and the
grievants all have interests which are entitled to consideration
are points clearly established by the first two provisions of i
the contract, Sections 0.1 and 0.2 which read as follows:
•

"0.1 This Agreement shall be binding upon the Union
and each of the above-named Locals and the Association
and the above-named Companies. The liability of the
Association and of any Company and of any Union and of
-any Local hereunder and the responsibility of the Association and of any such Company or of the Union and of
and Local for its compliance with the provisions of
this Agreement shall be several, and not joint.
"0.2 Unless otherwise provided herein to the contrary
"employees" as used in this Agreement shall be construed
to refer to the employees of the Companies who are parties to this Agreement in the unit for which the Union
was certified by the National Labor Relations Board on
March 9, 1953."
Based upon the transcript of testimony and the evidence form-

ing the record herein and having considered the respective posthearing briefs of the parties, I find and conclude that:
1. beginning on various dates between February 1, 1961
and March 3, 1961 and until their filing of letters of
intent to become regular employees of Pabst on a
regularly scheduled basis, grievants were unattached
regular employees working on an irregular basis both
in regard to continuity of days worked for Pabst
and with respect to their performance of both unit
work and non-unit work during the approximately
fifteen month period here in question;
2. that their "most recent starting dates" as contemplated by Section 4.5-3 of the contract between Local
153 and Pabst was the first day of the most recent
period of unbroken and uninterrupted employment with
Pabst immediately preceding their respective filings
of letters of, intent to become regularly scheduled
Pabst employees in the unit represented by Local 153.

-7-

Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the.
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the parties makes the following AWARD:

Pabst Brewing Company did not violate its collective
bargaining agreement with Local 153 by failing to base
grievants' respective seniority dates upon their respective earliest employment dates with the company. The
seniority dates assigned are appropriate and are in
accordance with the said collective bargaining agreement,

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December
1972
STATE OF: New York)
.
COUNTY OF New York) " " "
On this
day of December, 1972 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same

-8-

72
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 812 Soft Drink Workers Union
AWARD
and
OPINION

and
Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was the dismissal of Michael H. Foster on October
15, 1971 proper under the contract? If not what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on February 14, 1972 at the New York
State Board of Mediation, at which time Mr. Foster, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of
the above Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly
as the "parties," appeared.

All concerned were afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the

Arbitrator's oath.
Based on the record before me I find no reason why Company witnesses would falsely testify against the grievant or
fabricate the incidents and observations which they detailed.
To accept the grievant's version of the events is to conclude
that those Company witnesses maliciously constructed a false
case against him.

There is nothing in the record from which

any such conclusion or even inference can be drawn.
Accordingly I accept the Company's version of the events
and hold that the grievant committed the offense charged and
that summary discharge is therefore mandated under Article 12
of the contract.

- 2 -

Accordingly the Undersigned makes the following AWARD:
The dismissal of Michael H. Foster on October 15,
1971 was proper under the contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED:
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of February, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
tne to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

|v.a»
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Utility Lodge Local 405
Award
and
Pratt & Whitney, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated October 5, 1970 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as
follows:
The Company correctly chose to apply the SUPPLEMENT TO
APPENDIX J to Mr. Fortier upon his return to the Utility Man position in Department 37 on August 30, 1971.
His proper rate of pay on that date shall be determined by application of the Altieri Award.

Eric p. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: August 31, 1972
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 31st day of August, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same0
Case No. 1230 0160 71

f

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

Utility Lodge Local 405

'

and

'

Opinion

Pratt & Whitney, Inc.
f

The issue is whether the grievant, Oscar J. Fortier, was
properly paid when he returned to a Utility Man position in
Department 37 on August 30, 1971.
A hearing was held at the Company offices in West Hartford, Connecticut on May 22, 1972, at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath was

expressly waived.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The pertinent aspects of Mr. Fortier's work record at the
Machine Tool Division, which dates from April 1, 1957, are as
follows:

On March 22, 1965, he entered Department 37 as a Util-

ity Man (Occupation No. 670, List No. 50, Joh Level 7), a bonus
paid position.

On July 18, 1970, he transferred to Department

31, also as a Utility Man (same Occupation List and Job Level),
still on bonus.

On September 3, 1970, Mr. Fortier exercised

his seniority rights and, in lieu of layoff, bumped into an
Inspector Helper position in Department 120 (Occupation No.425,
List No. 74, Job Level 6), a day rated position.

He remained

there until August 30, 1971, when he exercised his seniority to
return to Utility Man position in Department 37.

- 2 In the October 1970 contract negotiations, the parties
agreed to convert all incentive rated (bonus) positions to a
measured day rate status.
tion was one occupation

The Department 37 Utility Man posi-

affected.

Upon his return to the Utility Man Position on August 30,
1971, the Company assigned Mr. Fortier a $3.58 hourly rate, the
then current measured day rate for that Job Level No. 7 position.

(See APPENDIX B, page 51 of the contract.)
The Union asserts that Mr. Fortier should, instead, have

been assigned an hourly rate of $3.77, a differential of 19 cents
per hour0
The dispute comes into sharper focus when the 1970 negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement are reviewed.
A major issue in the 1970 negotiations was the Company's
proposal to have all incentive (bonus) positions in the Machine
Tool Division change over to measured day rated positions.

Its

initial proposal would have entailed a reduction in earnings
for nearly 95% of employees affected.
The Company subsequently modified its position and proposed,
in brief, that incentive rated employees who were actually working on October 2, 1970, be "red circled" at a rate based upon
their individual straight time average earned rate, as computed
on June 1, 1970, if such rate would be higher than the measured
day rate to be established for the position.

Further, the Com-

pany proposed that employees so "red circled" would retain their
"red circle" rate as long as they held the same position occupied on October 2, 1970, and would have their "red circle"

- 3 rate increased by the same amount as any general increase which
would be negotiated.

Agreement upon the Company's revised pro-

posal was reached prior to the contract's expiration.

The terms

of that accord now appear in APPENDIX J (pages 59, 60) of the
current Agreement„
Despite having reached tentative accord on this issue, a
strike began October 5, 1970.

One of the important unresolved

issues involved the treatment of employees who, on October 2,
1970, were on layoff status from incentive rated positions. The
parties resolved this problem by agreeing to what now is the
SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX J (pages 60, 61).

For reasons which

will become evident below, it is appropriate to note that the
SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX J was at issue in Case No. 12-30-0159-71,
decided on July 18, 1972, by Arbitrator James V. Altieri after
the close of argument in this case.
CONTRACT CLAUSE
The pertinent contract clauses are APPENDIX J, and the
SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX J, which appear in the contract as a result of the 1970 negotiations.

Ref erence to them may be made

therein.
UNION"S POSITION
The Union argues that upon his return to the Department 37
Utility Man position on August 30, 1971, Mr. Fortier's rate of
pay should have been governed by the provisions of APPENDIX J,
and not the SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX J.

The latter, it asserts

has no application here since Mr. Fortier was not on layoff
status on October 2, 1970.

Instead he was actively at work,

- 4albeit as an Inspector Helper.

He had recall rights (later

exercised) to the Utility Man position.

Until such time as

those recall rights expired, it insists he would not come under the SUPPLEMENT as a laid off employee.
It maintains that Section 3 of APPENDIX J is specifically
applicable to Mr. Fortier in that he was one of the "...incentive employees of the Company who were actually working on
October 2, 1970 ..."

Therefore, he should have been "red

circled" at his June 1, 1970 average earned rate.
While it does not dispute the fact Mr. Fortier was not on
an incentive job on October 2, 1970, it insists that Section 3
cannot be interpreted to require that an "incentive employee" be
actually working on an incentive job on that date.

Rather,

Section 3 required only that Mr. Fortier be an "incentive employee" on that date.

He meets this test, it asserts, under

the terms of Article VII, Section 5.
SECTION 5. An employee transferred from one
occupation to another will retain his seniority in his former occupation for a period of
one year when his accumulated seniority will
be transferred to the occupation in which he
is presently employed.
Under this provision, the Union contends that Mr. Fortier
retained seniority on the Department 37 Utility Man incentive
occupation for a one-year period following his transfer (on
9/3/70) to Department 120's Inspector Helper position.

Having

retained seniority in that incentive position, it argues he
must be considered an "incentive employee" within the meaning
of Section 3.
Applying this reasoning, it concludes that Mr. Fortier's

- 5 proper rate of pay on August 30, 1971, should have been $3.77 a calculation reached by taking his "red circle" rate of $3.56
(based upon his individual straight time average earned rate
computed as of June 1, 1970) and adding to it the general increase of 2l£ per
hour to which all "incentive employees" pro.tected by Section 3 were eligible to receive on October 5, 1970
in accordance with the terms of APPENDIX J's Section 4.
COMPANY'S POSITION
The Company denies that Section 3 of APPENDIX J applies to
Mr. Fortier.

Instead, it asserts that SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX J

is controlling in his situation.
It contends that in exercising his seniority rights in
September 1970 to displace (bump) another employee from the Department 120 Helper position, in lieu of lay off from Department 37, Mr. Fortier must be regarded the same as any other employee whose seniority gave him recall rights to Department 37.
In short, he should be equated with all other incentive paid
employees who, on October 2, 1970, were on layoff status. Such
employees, it asserts, are covered by Section 1 of the SUPPLEMENT
TO APPENDIX J and not by Section 3 of APPENDIX J.
Accordingly, when Mr. Fortier returned to the Utility Man
position on August 30, 1971, he was properly assigned a $3.58
hourly rate since the SUPPLEMENT provides that employees with
three years recall (the category into which Mr. Fortier fits)
will receive not less than the appropriate contract scale at
the time of recall, if it is higher than their average earned
rate as of June 1, 1970.

Since the position called for a $3.58

- 6 rate, it assigned that rate to him rather than his $3.56 average earned rate0
The Company maintains that in order to receive a "red circle"
rate under Section 3 of APPENDIX J, to which would be added the
October 1970 2l£ general increase, Mr. Fortier had to be actually
working on an incentive position on October 2, 1970.

Since on

that date he was assigned to a day rated position, he did not
fall under Section 3's coverage.
The Company lays great stress upon the 1970 bargaining history.

It forcefully argues that its clear intent (in making

the proposal which led to the present APPENDIX J) was to "red
circle" only that narrow group of employees actually working on
an incentive position as of October 2, 1970.

That is only those

who were immediately to be affected by the conversion to measured day rates were to be protected. The SUPPLEMENT TD APPENDIX J
(the essence of which was not proposed until after the October
5, 1970 strike began) was to apply to all other employees who
had held incentive rated positions, but who on October 2, 1970
were on lay off and still had recall rights to such positions,
or to those who had bumped from an incentive position prior to
that date0

As to those employees, the Company concedes it had

a "residual liability when and if they returned to their old
incentive jobs."

That liability was to be discharged under the

terms of the SUPPLEMENT.
OPINION
The threshold question before me is whether the Company
improperly denied Mr. Fortier, upon his return to the Department
37 Utility Man position en August 30, 1971, a rate of pay gov-

- 7 erned by the provisions of APPENDIX J 0
The heart of the Union's argument that Section 3 of
APPENDIX J applies here rests upon its assertion that Mr. Fortier
retained status as an "incentive employee" in Department 37 by
virtue of the provisions of Article VII, Section 5.
Article VII deals with the subject of seniority, and Section 5 within it governs the seniority rights of employees to
their former position when transferred from one occupation to
another.

Section 5 is intended to protect the right of an em-

ployee so transferred to retain his seniority status in his former occupation for a one year period.

If he does not return to

that position within that time limit, his accumulated seniority
will be transferred to the position in which he finds himself.
There is no question but that Mr. Fortier had a right,
which he exercised without Company protest, to return to the
Utility Man position in Department 37 when the opportunity arose
in August, 1971, the Section 5 one-year time period not having
expired„
However, I do not conclude that his right to return to said
position qualified Mr. Fortier as one of the "incentive employees of the Company who were actually working on October 2, 1970..V
Mr. Fortier, of course, was not working on an incentive
position on October 2, 1970.

He was then an Inspector Helper

in Department 120, a day-rated position.

As such, he retained

(for a one-year period) seniority in his Utility Man occupation
by virtue of Article VII, Section 5.

Retention of seniority

to that position did not, in my judgment, also include the

- 8 additional right to be considered an incentive employee as of
October 2, 1970.
Stated otherwise, while Article VII, Section 5 gave Mr.
Fortier the right to retain seniority in his former incentive
rated position, that clause cannot be construed so as also to
have granted him status as an "incentive employee."
An incentive employee is, after all, one whose compensation
is a direct outgrowth of an incentive plan.

Once removed from

that plan - even though holding a right to retain seniority to
a position covered by it - an employee then engaged in a day
rated occupation cannot properly be considered an "incentive
employee."

Had Mr. Fortier returned to his former incentive

position prior to October 2, 1970, he would on that date have
been an "incentive employee."
Having found that Mr. Fortier was not, by virtue of Article
VII, Section 5, an "incentive employee," it follows that he was
not subject to the provisions of APPENDIX J, Section 3.
An analysis of Section 3 buttresses this conclusion.

The

Union has argued that Section 3 does not specify that an "incentive employee" who is at work on October 2, 1970 need be working
on an incentive position. That is true.

Yet, it is clear to me

that that was precisely what the parties intended Section 3 to
mean.

Given the negotiating history, no other conclusion would

be logical.
APPENDIX J appeared in this Agreement for the first time
following the October, 1970 negotiations along with the SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX J.

It represents the result of a difficult

negotiation problem: the conversion of the Machine Tool Division

- 9 incentive program to measured day rate.
The basic problem inherent in that conversion was dealt
with in two distinct steps.

First, agreement was reached as to

those who were actually working on incentive positions as of
October 2, 1970.

Those employees, after all, were to be most

directly and immediately affected by the conversion from incentive.

It is only natural that they should have received prim-

ary focus.

Only after their situation was resolved (shortly

before the strike began) did the parties seriously turn to the
effect of the conversion of others - in particular, those who
had been laid off, transferred or bumped from incentive positions.

In doing so they agreed upon what now appears as the

SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX J.
APPENDIX J and its SUPPLEMENT must be read together.
two complement each other.

The

They deal with two aspects of the

same problem: how to treat employees affected by the conversion
from incentive to measured day rate.
however.

Their focus is different

APPENDIX J relates to those directly and immediately

.affected by the conversion - i.e., those actually performing on
incentive positions on the effective date of the conversion.
THE SUPPLEMENT relates to those not then on incentive positions,
but who have retained seniority rights to such.

It is clear to

me that Mr. Fortier fits into this latter category, and not the
former.
Accordingly, I find that the Company did not improperly
deny Mr. Fortier, upon his return to the Department 37 Utility
Man position on August 30, 1971, a rate of pay governed by the

- 10 provisions of APPENDIX J.
It remains to be determined, then, whether Mr. Fortier's
rate of pay was properly established on August 30, 1971 under
the SUPPLEMENT to APPENDIX J.
The application of "red circle" rates to employees on lay
off status (the position in which the Company has argued Mr.
Fortier fits) has been arbitrated under the SUPPLEMENT recently in Case No. 12-30-0159-71 before Arbitrator Altieri.

Suffice

it to say that the parties have agreed to apply the Altieri
Award to Mr. Fortier's situation, should I rule that the
SUPPLEMENT is controlling.

As the Company pointed out, while

that Award would not be res ajudicta it would be "sufficiently
compelling to be dispositive" (Tr.38.) In view of this, no
fruitful purpose would be served by an attempt to interpret the
SUPPLEMENT independently.

EricJV Schmertz
Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES
INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

"
'
i

Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702 Welfare Fund;
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702 Pension Fund

'
'
'
'
i

and

AWARD

'
i

Radiant Laboratories, Inc.

The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the contract
between the above named parties and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of said parties, makes the following AWARD:
For the months March through July, 1972 Radiant
Laboratories, Inc. owes the Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians Local 702 Welfare Fund the
sum of $1,121.64.
For the months March through July 1972 Radiant
Laboratories, Inc. owes the Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians Local 702 Pension Fund the
sum of $15,003.34,
The above sums are past due. Therefore Radiant
Laboratories, Inc. is directed to pay said sums
to said Funds forthwith with interest, plus the
penalty of 1% of the unpaid balance after the
10th of each month pursuant to prior notice of
the Trustees of said Funds.
The Arbitrator's fee for 1/2 day in the amount
of $100.00 shall be borne by the Company. Therefore Radiant Laboratories, Inc. shall pay Local
702 Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians the sum
of $100.00 representing the Arbitrator's fee paid
by the Union.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: October 18, 1972
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) ' " "
On this 18th day of October, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR FILM LABORATORIES INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Film Technicians, I0A0T0S0E0
Award
and
Opinion

and
Radiant Laboratories, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Whether the
February 1,
rate of pay
if so, what

employer has since on or about
1972, failed to pay the proper
to Color Machine Operators, and
shall the remedy be?

A hearing was held at the Laboratory on July 3, 1972 at
which time representatives of the above named parties appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
The question is whether the rates of pay negotiated and
set forth in the Memorandum of Agreement dated October 1, 1971
to October 1, 1972 for Panel Printers operating at 240 FPM
should be absorbed in whole or in part within "red circle" rates
of pay0
The grievants are nine Color Machine Operators, Grade 5.
All were employed prior to the negotiation of the Memorandum
at rates of pay in excess of the minimum contract rate.

It is

undisputed that their higher pay reflected merit increases and/
or their special ability to run high speed machines.

All but

one carried these "red circle" rates from other laboratories
when hired by this Company.

The remaining one was granted an

increase by the Company to "red circle" status.

- 2 The Company contends that because these operators enjoyed
rates of pay in excess of the contract rate, and because their
higher rates reflected their ability to run high speed machines,
the subsequently negotiated increases in pay for the operation
of Panel Printers at 240 FPM should not apply to these operators.

Or at least as to them the negotiated increase should

be reduced by the amount their regular rates of pay exceed the
contract rate.
While I appreciate the Company's economic argument, especially when it and the Industry are presently confronted with
severe financial and competitive pressures, I cannot find a contractual basis to support its position.
Article 17 of the Memorandum of Agreement dated October 1,
1971 to October 1, 1972 provides for no exceptions to the machine rates negotiated therein.

As such it must be construed as

applicable to all Group 5 employees performing the work covered by that Article.

It did not exempt Group 5 employees who

enjoyed "red circle" rates, nor did it call for any diminution
in the extra money to be paid when the machines are run at
240 FPM, 360 FPM and 480 FPM by a particular operator whose
regular pay rate exceeded the contract rate.
Indeed to accept the Company's argument would mean that
the grievants would not receive thefull pay increase negotiated
in Article 17 of the Memorandum.

Viewed another way, unless

they received the increase on top of their actual pay, the merit
increases which they previously received and presumably earned
because of special abilities, and which made up part of their
"red circle" rate would be erodedin whole or in part.

- 3 In my view, if Article 17 of the Memorandum was so intended - to deprive some Group 5 employees of all or a portion of
the rate increase, or to subsume it within and thereby reduce
or take away previously granted merit increases - the Memorandum
of Agreement, negotiated after the grievants had received "red
circle" rates, should have said so explicitly.

In other words

such an untraditional result cannot be inferred from the present,
bare language of Article 17.
Accordingly the Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named
parties makes the following. AWARD:
The Company since on or about February 1, 1972
has not paid the proper rate of pay to Color
Machine Operators when they have operated the
Panel Printer at 240 FPM. Their rate should
have been and shall be 30<: an hour above the
individual rates of pay which they received
prior to negotiation of the Memorandum of
Agreement dated October 1, 1971 to October 1,
1972. The Company shall make appropriate adjustments in pay for the periods of time the grievants operated those machines at that rate of speed.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

Cric S\z /
Permanent Arbitrator

/

DATED: July
1972
STATE OF New York )ss..
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of July, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 72 A5

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
T

Society of Stage Directors and
Choreographers

'
'

Award

!

and
Robert
L. Steele
- _ _ _ - _ _ _ _

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

!

'
t
'

The Undersigned having been duly designated as the Arbitrator between the above named parties, and having been duly sworn,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union has failed to establish the existence
of an agreement between the parties to arbitrate
the instant disputes.
Accordingly, without prejudice to the rights of the
parties in any other forum, the claims of Bernard
Barrow and Doug Rogers are not arbitrable

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: November 13, 1972
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 13th day of November, 1972,
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me
me to be the individual described in and
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
ted the same.
Case No. 1330 0589 71

before me personally
known and known to
who executed the
to me that he execu-

I

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'

Ricardo Colina
Award
and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Award, as follows;
The Company has not established by clear and convincing evidence that there was just cause for
the discharge of Ricardo Colina. He shall be reinstated with back pay excluding the period from
June 9 to July 7, 1971, and less his earning if
any, from gainful employment during the period
from his discharge to his reinstatement„

Eric J/ Schmertz
Chairman

William E. Malarkey
Concurring
Dissenting

Mel Brenner
Concurring
Dissenting
DATED: March 27, 1972
STATE OF New York )ss> .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 27th day of March, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: March
1972
STATE OF New York )ss..
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of March, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared William E. Malarkey to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

DATED: March
1972
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) ':
On this
day of March, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Mel Brenner to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Ricardo Colina
and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.

'
'
i
'
'
t
'

Opinion of
Chairman

In accordance with the applicable provisions of the
Employee Grievance Procedure, the Undersigned was selected as
the Chairman of a three-man Board of Arbitration to hear and
decide, together with the other members of said Board, the
following stipulated issue;
Was there just cause for the discharge of Ricardo
Colina and if not what shall be the remedy?
(It was stipulated that any back pay Award would
exclude the period June 9 to July 7, 1971.)
In accordance with the Arbitration provisions of the
Employee Grievance Procedure, Messrs. William E. Malarkey and
Mel Brenner served as the other members of the Board of Arbitration.
A hearing was held at the Company offices on January 14,
1972 at which time Mr. Colina, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant,11 appeared, and was represented by counsel.

Represen-

tatives of the Company also appeared, and all concerned were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly

waived the oath of the Arbitrators.
Prior to his discharge the grievant was a ticket agent.
The Company does not charge him with incompetence, or failure
to follow Company rules and procedures or even negligence in

- 2 the handling of his duties.
and unequivocal.

Rather the charge is most serious

The Company claims that the grievant know-

ingly participated in a larcenous scheme to fraudulently convert and transform into money for the benefit of unauthorized
persons, negotiable airline ticket vouchers.

In short, the

charge is that he committed theft or was a willing accessory
to theft.
As in all discharge cases, for its action to be upheld,
the Company must meet the burden of establishing the offending employee's culpability by clear and convincing evidence
as well as showing that the offense warranted the ultimate penalty of discharge.

In the instant case there can be no serious

dispute over the propriety of the penalty if the charge is sustained under the foregoing requisite standard.
So far as this Arbitrator is concerned it is especially
important in this case, because of the seriousness of the charge
and its obvious impact on the grievant*s future both personally
and occupationally, that the Company be required to prove the
accusation clearly and convincingly.

The accusation parallels

a crime and although this is not a criminal proceeding with
criminal penalties, and though the criminal standards of proof
are not required, a finding that the grievant committed the
offense charged will not only sustain his termination, but
could well render him virtually unemployable elsewhere.
Within this well settled frame, and based on the entire
record before me I am not persuaded that the Company has met
its burden of establishing the grievant's culpability by clear

- 3 and convincing evidence.

This is not to say that the grievant

was not part of the planned thefts.

Such a finding is unnec-

essary because it is not the grievant's burden to go forward
and establish his innocence.

Rather it is to say that the

total record falls short of establishing the grievant's guilt,
by the standards required in such cases.
There is no evidence in the record linking the grievant
to other employees who admitted their participation in the
scheme.

There is no evidence that any of those persons im-

plicated the grievant.

None of those who admitted their guilt

testified in this arbitration, and so far as the record before
me isconcerned, the investigation of those individuals did not
implicate the grievant as a participant or co-conspirator.
There was no independent evidence introduced of any participation by the grievant in any of the stages of the scheme
up to the point where the stolen vouchers were presented to
him, as a ticket agent, for transformation into money.

In

other words I find nothing in the record which would link the
grievant to the initial purloining of the vouchers; or their
placement in a secreted location; or the use of fake identification to convert the vouchers into either money or negotiable
checks.

Nor is there any evidence that the grievant benefited

monetarily from the transactions or came into any suspicious
.
sums of money.
Basically the only evidence against the grievant is that
during the course of his duties he "cashed in" a number of
these vouchers for persons who, as was later determined, pres-

- 4 ented fake identification.

Specifically a person would pres-

ent a voucher to the grievant with some sort of false identification (such as a fake out of state driver's licence) which
coincided with the name on the airline voucher.

The grievant,

pursuant to his normal authority as a ticket agent, then transformed the voucher into money or a negotiable check for that
"customer."
It is this series of transactions upon which the Company
relies in asserting the grievant's culpability.

The Company

argues that the fact that the grievant did not carefully check
the identification of applicants for a refund together with the
relatively large number of vouchers which passed over his desk,
are evidence of his knowledge of and participation in the scheme
Obviously this is one logical conclusion.
the only reasonable explanation.

But it is not

And absent other evidence

implicating or linking the grievant to the plot, I am not satisfied that it establishes his guilt either clearly or convincingly.

It is equally possible that the grievant was mere-

ly negligent, or unmindful or unresponsive to new Company procedures.

The record indicates that for an extended period of

time ticket agents transformed airline vouchers into cash or
checks in a lax and casual manner.

The standards for identi-

fication of the "customer" were unclear, varied and generally
unenforced.

Though prior to the incidents involved in this

case the Company took steps to tighten up the procedures especially with regard to what would be required as identification, the record shows that ticket agents did not totally

- 5 change their casual practices.

So, though I am persuaded that

the grievant failed to adhere to the newly tightened regulations and thereby negligently "cashed in" vouchers without requiring proper identification, I do not think that this is
enough, absent other evidence of proscribed or suspicious activity, to establish his guilt of the charge of theft.
To my mind there remains the single question of why a
significant number of vouchers were cashed in at the grievant's
work location.

Again one possible answer is that he was part

of the scheme.

Another, however, and equally logical in my

view is that other employees who were in fact actively engaged
in the scheme knew that the grievant was lax or negligent or
overly casual in carrying out the procedures regarding the
cashing in of the vouchers, and that he, unlike other ticket
agents, would be less demanding of proper identification and
less suspicious of what was going on.

In other words, and in

summary, what took place could have been as much because the
grievant was an unwitting and innocent dupe as it could have
been because of any knowing participation in the scheme.
Had the Company disciplined him for failure to comply
with its newly tightened rules or for inefficiency or for
neglect, I might well have agreed that some disciplinary penalty would be in order.

But where the charge is theft and

where, at least to my mind, there are other logical explanations of what took place as well as the absence of other probative evidence implicating the grievant in other phases of the
larcenous scheme, I cannot find that the evidence establishes

- 6 his guilt by the clear and convincing standard required in
such cases.
Accordingly the grievant shall be reinstated with back
pay, excluding the period June 9 to July 7, 1971 and less any
moneys he earned in gainful employment elsewhere during the
period of his discharge.

r
Eric J, Schmertz
Chairman
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Triangle Laboratories, Inc.
and

Award

Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
Because of the special circumstance in this case
the Company's petition to discharge John Cella is
denied.
However Mr. Cella and the Union are warned that
resort to self help during the term of the contract
is prohibited and that any such improper activity
hereafter engaged in by Mr. Cella whether or not
he was so instructed by the Union would subject him
to discipline including discharge. The Union is
warned that any such instructions to stewards and
employees would subject the union to liability0
I direct that the Arbitrator's fee be shared equally.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

l

DATED: June 7 1972
STATE OF New'York )Ss.:
COUNTY OF New York)

O

On this y day of June, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
Case No. 72 Ql

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'

Triangle Laboratories, Inc.

'

and

'

Opinion

r

Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.

'

i

The stipulated issue is:
Whether or not the Company has cause to discharge
John Cella?
A hearing was held on May 24, 1972 at which time Mr. Cella
and representatives of the Company and Union appeared.

All con-

cerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The par-

ties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath and the contractual time limit for rendition of the Award.
The Company advances two charges against Mr. Cella; that
he improperly interfered with production by instructing certain machine operators to "put up leader" during break periods
and that he initiated and led a work stoppage of about three
hours duration, both during regular shift hours on May 23, 1972,
By agreement between the parties the Company has retained
Cella in its employ pending the outcome of this arbitration.
In my capacity as Permanent Arbitrator under the Industry
contract, I have repeatedly ruled that Section 15 of the contract, which sets forth the exclusive method for redress and
adjudication of disputes, implicitly proscribes strikes, slowdowns, work stoppages, interferences by employees with normal
production, countermanding Company instructions and lock-outs.
I have also held that employees and Union officials are re-

- 2 quired to use Section 15 of the contract to resolve contract
disputes and that resort to self help is unlawful.

I reiter-

ate those rulings in this case.
Based on the evidence before me I find that Cella, as
Shop Steward, violated that implicit obligation in one of the
two circumstances charged by the Company - namely by initiating
and leading a work stoppage.

But because I am not satisfied

that he fully understood his responsibilities under the special
conditions involved, I have decided not to authorize his discharge this time.

But he is warned that a repetition of this

or a like offense, no matter who ordered it, would be grounds
for discharge„
I do not find that Cella was culpable of an improper interference with production when he instructed the machine operators to put up leader during break or relief periods.

The evi-

dence is that he was instructed to do so by Mr. Voelpel, the
Union's Vice President, and that he had reason to believe that
Voelpel's instructions accurately reflected Voelpel's agreement
with Mr. De Mercuric, the Company's President, as to how the
machine would operate with a crew of one less than contractually
required.

In other words, whether accurate or not Voelpel did

tell Cella that it was the agreement of the Union and Company
that the machine could be operated with a crew of one less than
required provided that leader was put up during breaks, relief
periods and meal periods and that the operators were to be so
informed.

So though the Company may have interpreted Cella's

instructions to the operators as violative of his duty not
to interfere with production, or as inconsistent with

- 3 Company instructions, or as violative of the Company's version
of the understanding between it and the Union regarding the
temporary operation of the machine Cella merely did what he
thought the Union and the Company agreed he should do, not
what he or the Union unilaterally decided.

Hence I cannot

find that Cella's action in that circumstance was a contract
violation.
Cella concedes that following the foregoing incident for
which he was suspended, he returned to the production area of
the plant, called "everybody out" and a work stoppage of
approximately three hours duration resulted.

His defense and

that of the Union on his behalf, is that he was expressly told
to do so by Voelpel.

In his testimony Voelpel freely acknowl-

edged that he so instructed Cella„
I take the opportunity of this case to admonish Voelpel
as well as Cella.

Union officials, whether employees or not

of the Company have a special duty to uphold the integrity of
the contract, including the grievance and arbitration provisions.

Voelpel's instruction to Cella to commence a work stop-

page was manifestly violative of the Union's obligation not to
engage in proscribed self help and may well have subjected the
Union to liability had the Company commenced an action against
the Union.

Also I want to make it clear that an employee or

shop steward is not immune from discipline when he initiates,
participates in, or is otherwise responsible for any proscribed self help activity even if he has been instructed to do so
by a Union official. In the future I will not hesitate to

- 4hold the Union liable for instructions to stewards or employees to engage in work stoppages, and I will uphold disciplinary penalties imposed on stewards and employees who engage in
such activities even if their Union instructed them to do so.
Anything less would be untenable, simply because work stoppages could be engaged in by a steward or employee with impunity on the excuse that they were instructed to do so by the
Union or a Union official.

That result would quickly destroy

the stability of the Collective Agreement by subverting the
intent and meaning of Section 15„
But it is this latter circumstance which I am not convinced Cella understood.

I think he knew - indeed he concedes -

that work stoppages and other proscribed activity which he
might initiate or participated in on his own, would be grounds
for disciplinary action including discharge.

He was so instruct

ed at a joint Company-Union meeting the latter part of October,
1971.

But I don't think he understood that he ran the same

risk and was similarly liable if he called a work stoppage
merely as an agent of his Union.

In the instant case I think

he was unclear where his obligations and loyalties lay.

There

is no evidence that he was told or knew that he ran the same
risks in calling a work stoppage on instructions of the Union
as if he did it on his own.
Nor indeed have I had occasion in any prior case to make
that clear.

In this Industry I have not had a similar situa-

tion brought to my attention.

Therefore I am prepared to give

Cella some benefit of the doubt, and to use this case to advise

- 5 him and all others similarly situated that hereafter discipline
imposed for activity of this type will be upheld,,
I state again as I have in the past that so long as I am
Permanent Arbitrator under this contract I see no reason why
the Union, its stewards or its members should order or engage
in any self help over contract disputes.

The grievance and

arbitration provisions of the contract, and especially the
"quickie arbitration" section are fully capable of redressing
all grievances and can provide full remedies for contract
breaches committed by an employer.
Accordingly, all concerned are on notice that stewards
and employees will be subject to disciplinary penalties and the
Union to organizational liability for improper resort to self
help during the term of the contract.

Eric Jr. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration '
between
WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC.

and

OPINION

and
AWARD

COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF AMERICA '

Appearances:

Company
ROBERT A. LEVITT, ESQ. Labor Counsel
LAWRENCE M. JOSEPH, ESQ.
LEONARD LIPSCHUTZ, ESQ.
Western Electric Company
195 Broadway
New York, N. Y. 10007
Union
WILLIAM A. MCHUGH, JR., ESQ.
Adair, Goldthwaite, Stanford and Daniel
6th Floor, Rhodes-Haverty Building
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
J.D. TAYLOR, President, CWA Local 3790
234 Quartermaster Road
Spartanburg, South Carolina 29301
H.T. Wade, Vice President, CWA Local 3790
1905 Twain Road
Greensboro, North Carolina

The Stipulated Issue is:
"Did the Company violate the agreement
by not paying the per diem pay to J.S.
Dobbins and C.F. Lewis on Saturday and
Sunday, March 6 and 7, 1971?"
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A hearing was held in Charlotte, North Carolina on
June 23, 1972 at which time representatives of the above
named Union and Company appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.
pressly waived.

The arbitrator's oath was ex-

Both sides filed post hearing briefs.

Joint Exhibit 3 herein, a Stipulation of the salient
facts of the case signed by representatives of the parties
on June 23, 1972 shows that the grievants, Dobbins and Lewis,
are installers employed by the Company in Charlotte, North
Carolina; that Dobbins had 20 years of service and Lewis 18;
that both were rated as high skill level installers (Index
5 and 4,respectively), Index 5 being the highest skill level
for an installer.

Installers are subject to "temporary

transfer" assignments under Article 13, Section 4 of the
Contract; both Dobbins and Lewis had been on numerous

"temporary

transfer" assignments and were on such an assignment, in
Raleigh, North Carolina, during February and March 1972.
Installers are also subject to overtime work assignment at
premium pay rates under Article 11 of the Contract.

Both

Dobbins and Lewis were subject to such an assignment of overtime work during the period when the events forming the basis
of the instant grievance occurred.

Representatives of the

Company and the Union which represents the unit of which
grievants are members, had theretofore reached agreement
pursuant to Article 11, Section 1.31 on a temporary 45-hour

-3work schedule for the Raleigh location, consisting of five
nine-hour days (Monday through Friday), 7:30 A.M. to 11:45
A.M. and 12:30 P.M. to 5:15 P.M. with no work scheduled for
Saturdays and Sundays.

Although Dobbins and Lewis were given notice of the
overtime work schedule on or before February 16, 1971 and
were subject to its provisions on Friday, February 26, 1971,
they gave notice on that day that they would not work the
full nine hour day by entering only eight hours on their
time tickets stating that they intended to leave at 4:15 "to
beat the traffic home."

They were informed by their super-

visors that they could not be excused from the overtime hour
of work because they had not given an adequate reason for
their absences as required by Article 11, Section 1.5 of the
Contract.

They were further advised that they would be in

an unexcused absence status from the time they left until
they returned to work and therefore, pursuant to Article 13,
Section 4.32 of the Contract, would not be eligible for weekend per diem payments and that they would be subject to
disciplinary action.

It was thereafter decided that Dobbins

and Lewis would receive the weekend per diem for February 27
and 28 but they were warned that in the future if they left
work early without giving an adequate reason they would not
be excused and that the Company would take appropriate action,

On the following Friday, March 5, 1971, Dobbins and

-4Lewis again notified their supervisors that they refused
to work the scheduled ninth hour that day by entering only
eight hours on their time tickets, this time citing, "personal
business" as the reason for their absences.

On that day,

testing, which is high skill level work, was in progress and
high skill level installers were needed.

Dobbins and Lewis

were so advised by their supervisors; they were told that
they were expected to work the time as scheduled and agreed
to by their Union representative, that they were needed on
the job, that the excuse which they had each given was not
adequate and that if they did not work the ninth hour their
absences would not be excused.

Dobbins and Lewis neverthe-

less left work at 4:15 P.M. on Friday, March 5, 1971; they
were not scheduled to work on Saturday and Sunday, March 6
and 7, 1971 and they returned to work on Monday, March 8, 1971.
Their absences from work from 4:15 to 5:15 P.M. on March 5,
1971 were not excused and neither man was paid per diem for
March 6 and 7, 1971.

The Union maintains that the withholding of weekend per
diem payments to the grievants was a disciplinary action by
the employer.

In support of this contention the Union shows

that in the course of the discussions of the February 26,
1971 absence grievants were warned that a future such unexcused
absence might lead to disciplinary action; that this warning
of February 26 was cited to the grievants by a Company representative in an interview on March 8, 1971 and that in the
same interview mention was made of the fact that per diem

-5for the March 6-7 weekend had not been paid.

This "interview"

actually consisted of the reading to grievants of a written
statement summarizing the events of February 26 and March 5
and warning the grievants that future unexcused absences
from work might lead to further disciplinary action, including suspension.

Thus, the union shows that before the March

5 absence and in connection with the first (February 26)
absence the grievants were warned orally that disciplinary action
would be taken in the event of a second unexcused absence;
that in connection with the second (March 5) absence per diem
payments were withheld; that on March 9 the grievants were
warned that in the event of a third unexcused absence further
disciplinary action would be taken.

From all of this the

union infers that the disciplinary action warned of on February
26, referred to in the March 9 interview and antecedent to
the further disciplinary action which would be taken in
connection with a third unexcused absence was the withholding
of per diem payments for the March 6-7 weekend.

This is a

possible inference but certainly not a necessary one and it
collapses in the light of one additional fact, i.e., that it
does not take into account the significance of the March 9
"interview".

The latter was, in fact, not an interview at

all, in the usual sense, but the occasion for reading to the
grievants an adverse report of their actions on February 26
and March 5 and for notifying them that the report was being
entered in their personnel files.

Thus the facts alleged by

the Union, when fully examined, suggest an inference quite
different from the one offered by the Union, namely, that
on the first occasion (February 26) the Company gave only
an oral warning; on the second occasion it gave an adverse

-6personnel report and written warning of further disciplinary
action including possible suspension in the event of a third such
incident, and that the disciplinary action in connection with
the March 5 absence was the March 8 interview, written warning
and insertion in the grievants' personnel files of adverse
personnel reports.

This latter inference assumes conclusive

proportions when consideration is given to the unrefuted
testimony of the witness Garvey that it is the established
policy and practice of the Company to employ progressive
discipline methods and, in response to a question by the
attorney for the Union, that in cases of refusal of overtime
work the usual practice would be to give a warning in the
first instance and in the event of a second refusal to give
another warning or possibly a suspension.

I therefore find

and conclude that the Company did discipline the grievants in
connection with their March 5 absence but that the disciplinary
action consisted of the insertion of adverse personnel reports
in the grievants' personnel files coupled with written warning
of further disciplinary action including possible suspension
in the event of future unexcused absences and that the withholding of the March 6-7 weekend per diem payments was not
disciplinary in nature.

Article 13, Section 4.31 of the contract between the
parties provides for the payment of per diem allowances to
employees on temporary transfer assignments; Section 4.32
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provides that when an employee is absent from work the per
diem allowance will be paid only if the absence is excused.
Company policy and practice in implementing these provisions
is to deny holiday or weekend per diem allowances where an
unexcused absence immediately precedes a weekend or holiday
and to resume the payment of per diem allowances only on
the first day that an employee returns to work.

These contract

provisions, identical in every respect, except for renumbering have been included in all contracts between the parties
since 1952; the implementing Company policy described above
has been the same throughout that period.

This policy has

been published by the Company in its written Supervisor's
Labor Relations Guide, copies of which are furnished to the
Union.

There is ample evidence that the Union is aware of the

combined effect of Section 4.32 and of the Company's implementing policy.

The Union has attempted to effect a change in

this condition numerous contract negotiations.

It has advised

its members, in writing of the Company's policy and practice,
and cautioned them of the circumstances which would cause
implementation.

In 1958 the matter was the subject of an

unfair labor practice charge before the NLRB which was withdrawn by the Union after the Company's answer was filed. In
an arbitration testing the validity of the Company's implementing policy where it was applied to deny holiday per diem
allowances to employees who were absent and unexcused on the

-8-

day preceding a holiday, Arbitrator Milton Rubin, in his
award of January 3, 1964, said:

"... the Company policy is acceptable
as an established, tried, tested and
mutually acknowledged implementing
practice giving practical effect to
the evident meaning and purpose of
the provisions (of Article 13,
Section 4.31 and 4.32)."

The fact that the grievants were absent for only part
of the day preceding the weekend is of no

material significance,

The above-mentioned 1958 unfair labor practice proceeding
related to an instance in which the Company withheld weekend
per diem payments to a group of workers who had engaged in a
Friday afternoon walk-off.

The fact that the absence in the

instant case involved a refusal and failure to work overtime
rather than straight time is equally immaterial.

Article 11

of the Contract requires that overtime schedules be negotiated.
In this case the temporary nine-hour day, forty-five hour
week schedule was duly negotiated and was agreed to by the
grievants1 representatives; the grievants knew of the temporary
overtime work schedule and chose not to comply with it despite
the fact that the Contract (Article 11), Section 1.5) bound
them to work the ninth hour unless they had an adequate reason
for not doing so.

Consideration need not be given to the

adequacy of grievant's excuse - "personal business" - for
their absence since, for the purpose of this arbitration, the
Union accepts the Company's finding that it was not adequate.

-9Based upon the transcript of testimony and the evidence
forming the record herein including stipulations of the parties,
and having considered their respective post-hearing briefs
and having examined the January 1964 Award of Arbitrator
Milton Rubin in an arbitration dealing with the same parties,
the identical contract provisions and Company policy and similar
facts to those involved herein, I find that:
1.

pursuant to duly negotiated temporary
overtime work schedules,the grievants
Dobbins and Lewis were properly scheduled
and obligated to work until 5:15 P.M. on
Friday, March 5, 1971;

2.

grievants failed and refused to work the
last hour of the duly scheduled work day
without providing an adequate excuse for
doing so and despite a warning that their
absence from work would not be excused,
absented themselves from work from and
after 4:15 P.M. on March 5, 1971 and were
consequently in a status of unexcused
absence from that hour and for the remainder
of that day;

3.

under the applicable provisions of the
Contract between the parties and the
"established, tried, tested and mutually
acknowledged implementing practice" of
the Company relating to the said Contract
provisions, the grievants1 unexcused
absence during the work period immediately
preceding a weekend when no work was
scheduled disqualified them for the receipt
of weekend per diem allowances.

-19Accordingly the Undersigned Arbitrator, having been
duly designated in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement between the above named Union and Company,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties, makes the following AWARD:

The Company did not violate the
agreement by not paying the per
diem pay to J.S. Dobbins and C.F.
Lewis on Saturday and Sunday,
March 6 and 7, 1971.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: August 23, 1972
STATE OF New York ) ss -.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 23rd day of August, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists
Award

and

and
Opinion

W-F Productions

In accordance with the applicable Arbitration provisions
of the contract covering the above named parties, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide a
dispute relating to the appearance and singing performance on
the David Frost TV show of the Hui Le Nani Singers, a high
school group from Punahua Academy, Honolulu, Hawaii without
payment to them of any fee.
AFTRA seeks payment by W-F Productions, the producer of
the David Frost Television Show and a signatory to the AFTRA
National Code of Fair Practice For Network Television Broadcasting, of the Code's minimum fee of $134.50 for each member
of the Hui Le Nani Singers, hereinafter referred to as "The
Group" plus 6-1/2 percent thereof to the AFTRA Pension & Welfare Fund.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on November 12, 1971 at which time representatives of the W-F Productions, hereinafter referred to as the
"Company," and AFTRA, hereinafter referred to as the "Union,"
appeared, and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence

- 2 and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The

Company and the Union expressly waived the contractual tripartite Board of Arbitration and agreed to the Undersigned as
the sole Arbitrator.
I find the Union's refusal to grant the Company a waiver
of the Code fee schedule for the appearance and singing performance of the Group to be unreasonable, inconsistent with past
practice in similar situations, and unsupported by a bona fide
economic reason or Union objective.
The reason advanced by the Union in explanation of its
denial of the Company's request for a waiver of the fee, was
that employment opportunities for Union member singing groups
had substantially diminished; that many were underemployed; and
that a performance of non-members - the Group in the instant
case - would further erode the job opportunities of
member singing groups.

Union

On this same basis the Union distinguish-

es the instant case from prior situations in which it granted
fee waivers for comparable groups of school singers.
This reason and distinction are not supported by the facts.
It is undisputed that the David Frost television show rarely
employs singing groups.

Uncontradicted is the Company's testi-

mony that had the Group not appeared and performed, no other
singing groups would have been employed as a replacement.

In-

deed, I am persuaded that the Group was invited on the show,
not solely or even primarily to sing, but rather principally
because of their multi-racial make-up, representing both
Hawaiian society and the personal philosophy of Actor Richard

- 3 Boone, a resident of that State.

The facts are that the Group

was not auditioned prior to the show; its singing ability was
not investigated by the Company and less than 1/2 of its total
time on the show was devoted to singing.

The balance was con-

sumed by a discussion of its unique racial and ethnic make-up
with Messrs. Frost and Boone.
I am satisfied that its invitation to appear was more as
a result of the strong urging of Boone because of his interest
in its multi-racial character than because of any entertainment qualities as singers.

In short I find that the Group,

made up of students of a Honolulu high school was both amateur
and not-for-profit; that but for its multi-racial make-up it
would not have been invited on the show; and that had it not
appeared and performed no Union member or group would have been
employed in its place.
Accordingly, because I find no factual support for the
Union's reason and objective and because I find no significant
differences between the instant case and prior situations where
the waiver was granted, I must conclude that in the instant
case the Union unreasonably withheld its approval of a legitimate waiver request.
The Undersigned, having been designated as the Arbitrator,
and having been duly sworn and having duly heard the allegatations and proofs of the parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union's claim is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

- 4 DATED: March /-

1972

STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) '"
On this r * day of March, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
ame.

Case No. 1330 0937 71

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration '
i
between

'

Local 1199, Drug and Hospital UnionJ
AFL-CIO
'
and
'

AWARD
Case No. 13330 1119 71

Woodland Nursing Home

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been duly designated
in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement dated June 7, 1971
between the above named parties, and having been duly sworn,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties,
makes the following AWARD:

There was just cause for the discharge
of Mattie B. Shaw.

Eric J7. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 28, 1972
STATE OF New York )ss<.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this Twenty ei£th day of June, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 1199, Drug and Hospital Union,
AFL-CIO
and

OPINION

Woodland Nursing Home

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement dated June 7, 1971 between
Woodland Nursing Home, hereinafter referred to as "the Home"
and Local 1199 Drug and Hospital Union, AFL-CIO, hereinafter
referred to as "the Union" the Undersigned was selected as
the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated
issue:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of Mattie B. Shaw? If not what shall
be the remedy?
Hearings were held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on March 1 and May 15, 1972 at which
time Mrs. Shaw, hereinafter referred to as the grievant and
representatives of the Union and Home appeared. All concerned
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Home filed

a post hearing brief.
The grievant was a nurses-aide from October, 1965 to
September 15, 1971, the date of her discharge.

Over the last

three years of employment she received a series of "incident
reports", interviews, and disciplinary warnings for a variety

-2of offenses.

It is undisputed that she had difficulty work-

ing with most of the charge nurses, and recently for that
reason; , and at her request she was transferred to the night
shift where she was employed at the time of her termination.
Also, prior to her transfer to the night shift she was a
union steward, and she and the Union contend that she
continued in that position on the night shift as well.

The Home charges that on the night of September 14, and
the morning of September 15, 1971 the grievant was insubordinate, in refusing to wash wheelchairs and by refusing to
return to her work station when so instructed; caused an
unauthorized work stoppage of nurses aides during the regular
working hours of that shift; used abusive and disrespectful
language to a managerial employee; and refused to leave the
Home when instructed to do so.

The Home contends that these

offenses, when viewed in the light of her prior record
constitute just cause for discharge.

The Home's contention is supported by the record before me,
During the course of the hearings the Union conceded that the
grievant'was asked to wash wheelchairs and she didn't do it".
The Union's defense is that the order to perform that work
originated with a managerial employee (Mr. May) who was not
authorized to give directions to nurses aides; that such work
was not among the duties of a nurses aide, and to single out

-3the grievant for disciplinary action when other nurses aides
also failed to perform the work but were not penalized, is
discriminatory.

I cannot accept these defenses, especially in view of the
grievant's actual or self styled position as the union
steward.

In that capacity and considering her record of

warnings and other admonitions she should have known of the
fundamental rule that an employee does not challenge the
propriety of a work order by refusing to carry it out.

Instead

he is required to perform the assignment and then test its
propriety

through the grievance procedures of the contract.

That the order may have been given by a person without actual
or apparent authority, as the grievant and the Union contend
herein, is not one of the exceptions to this rule.

The limited

exceptions, such as safety and illegality are not conditions
present in the instant case.

Nor can I accept the contention of unequal treatment.

Again

because of her actual or alleged status as a steward, the
grievant had a special duty to set an orderly example; to
perform the contested work, subject to her right to grieve.
It is well settled that a steward's duty to uphold the orderly
procedure of the contract is greater than that of other employee
And where that duty is breached the penalty imposed on a

-4steward may be properly more severe than for other offending
employees.

Also there is nothing before me to show that any

of the other nurses aides had a prior record of incident
reports, interviews and disciplinary warnings, and difficulties
with charge-nurses as extensive as that of the grievant.

I must also conclude that the grievant unjustifiably and
unnecessarily, berated May with abusive and disrespectful
language both when he instructed her to wash wheelchairs and
when he asked her to return to her work station.

I find no

reason in the record why May, who at the time of the hearing
was no longer in the Home's employ, would falsify this testimony
which vividly and unequivocally set forth the loud, argumentative and abusive manner in which he was treated by the
grievant on the night in question.

Indeed May's testimony

in this regard is not significantly refuted.

I find it immaterial whether or not May had actual
authority to issue orders to or oversee the work of nurses
aides.
knew it.

Clearly he was a managerial employee, and the grievant
Prior to that night he was introduced to the work

force, including the grievant, by Mr. Ware, the Administrator
of the Home, as Ware's "eyes and ears".

The staff, including

the grievant, was told by Ware that May represented him at the

-6First, without notice to or permission of her supervisor,
she left her work station and went to another floor to meet
with other nurses aides.

The evidence shows that this was

not the first time she left her work place without permission.
Indeed one of her prior warnings involves this offense, and
she had been clearly cautioned that she would be subject to
further discipline if she did it again.

Considering the

work of a nursing home, the care of the aged and infirm, a
rule restricting the leaving of a work station is reasonable
both for stewards and ordinary employees.

And there is no

evidence that the Home has invoked the rule in a manner to
unfairly or arbitrarily impede the proper administration of
the contract or the processing of grievances.

Additionally, the evidence supports the charge that the
grievant disregarded a directive to return to her work station
not just from May but also from nurse Totten, who concededly
had supervisory authority over her.

Second, I find that though she may not have led or initiated
the concerted protest by the nurses aides, her informational
remarks to those who asked her about the work order to wash
wheel chairs, either encouraged it or led other nurses aides
to believe that a demonstration was appropriate.

Specifically

-7she admits that when asked by other nurses aides if they
have to wash wheelchairs she replied "we never did it before".
Though subject to various interpretations I think it logical
if other nurses aides, looking to the grievant as their
present or former steward, interpreted that to mean they
could resist the assignment.

Again her clear duty in that

circumstance was to instruct the aides to perform the work
even if outside their job classifications; and that the order
would be grieved.

It was her duty, in the steward role with

which she cloaked herself, to make clear to the aides that
self help in the form of a temporary cessation of work was
wrong, and that the grievance and arbitration procedures of
the contract were fully capable of redressing all breaches
of the contract committed by the Home.

In short these failings or ommissions of the grievant,
in the role which she and the Union ascribed to her, are just
incompatible with her assertion that she was only attempting
to "cool the situation".

Rather, I must conclude that her

actions in supporting the protest against the order to clean
wheelchairs were designed to encourage and support this
proscribed type of protest, and that she acted as its spokesman, if not its leader.

Standing alone these foregoing offenses, without deciding

-8the remaining issue of whether the grievant improperly refused
to leave the Home when told to do so, are generally considered
grounds for discharge irrespective of a prior record.

Here,

additionally, the grievant has a record of prior difficulties,
including relevant warnings.

Accordingly I cannot find that

the Home's decision to discharge her lacked just cause.

Eric /. Schmertz
Arb iterator

June 28, 1972

